


ECONOMICS OF NETWORK GROWTH



Radcliffe Exploratory Seminar on Dynamic Networks:
Behavior, Optimization and Design

October 20-21, 2006, Radcliffe Institute, Cambridge MA

David Levinson

University of Minnesota &
Imperial College

NEXUS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS



■ Research Assistants


- 
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 - Wenling Chen
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 - Feng Xie *
 - Bhanu Yerra *
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 - Digital Media Center: Technology Enhanced Learning Grant
 - Economics and Social Research Council (UK)

S-CURVES

Proportion of
Maximum Extent



LEGEND



Interstate



Undivided Highway




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


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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
1994



THE REALM OF NETWORK EVOLUTION

Decision-making unit		Ownership		
		Public	Mixed	Private
Centralized	Network-based	Network Design Problem (NDP) - Welfare Max		NDP - Profit- Max
		Optimization		
Coalitions	Area-based	Network Growth Problem (NGP) - Agent “utility”-Max		
	Corridor- based			
Autonomous	Link - based	Tools: Statistical Estimation, Agent-Based Simulation		

A TALE OF TWO NETWORKS



- It was the best of plans, it was the worst of plans ...

Washington, DC

- Network (like city) planned as a whole, by a single (collective) agent in 1950s and 1960s, opened 1976
- Plans largely unchanged over 50 years despite changing circumstances
- 171 km, 564 k pax/day (out of Baltimore Washington metro pop of 8.5 m) [note also small Baltimore Metro)]


London, England

- Network “planned” by many independent agents (Metropolitan Line, District Line, Northern Line, etc.) over period from 1863 onwards
- Agents were consolidated over time, first by private sector (Charles Yerkes), then public sector (government)
- Private sector is being reintroduced using “PPP”, private companies now responsible for infrastructure
- 408 km, 2.67 m pax/day (out of 7.5 m pop)

Deployment of the London Underground


Cumulative Number of Stations

Stations Opened by Year




NETWORK GROWTH OCCURS OVER SPACE AND TIME


- Economics historically (since Classical period anyway) was inured to space and time, assumed perfect information, and dealt with population aggregates
- Need to take different approaches: agent-based, taking place over space and time, with imperfect information, and heuristics




- Hierarchy (relative importance)



- Topology (connectedness)



- Morphology (shape)



REVENUE AND COST MODELS

- Toll is the only source of revenue
- Annual revenue generated by a link is total toll paid by the travelers
- Initially assume only one type of cost, function of length, flow, link speed

$$\tau_a = \rho_0 l_a^{\rho_1} v_a^{\rho_2}$$

$$R_a = \tau_a (365 \cdot f_a)$$

$$C_a = \mu \cdot l_a^{\alpha_1} \cdot f_a^{\alpha_2} \cdot v_a^{\alpha_3}$$

NETWORK INVESTMENT MODEL (1)

- A link based model
- Speed of a link improves if revenue is more than cost of maintenance, drops otherwise

$$v_a^{t+1} = v_a^t \left(\frac{R_a}{C_a} \right)^\beta$$

Where:


v_a^t is speed of link a at time step t ,


β is speed reduction coefficient.


No revenue sharing between links: Revenue from a link is used in its own investment


INITIAL ASSUMPTIONS


- Base case
 - Network - speed $\sim U(1, 1)$
 - Land use $\sim U(10, 10)$
 - Friction factor $w=0.01$
 - Travel cost, Revenue $d_a \{ \lambda = 1.0, \rho_o = 1.0, \rho_1 = 1.0, \rho_2 = 0.0 \}$
 - Infrastructure Cost $\{ \mu = 365, \alpha_1 = 1.0, \alpha_2 = 0.75, \alpha_3 = 0.75 \}$
 - Investment model $\{ \beta = 1.0 \}$
 - Speeds on links running in opposite direction between same nodes are averaged





















































HIERARCHY

- Succeeded in growing transportation networks from undifferentiated links to differentiated structure
- Sufficiency of simple link based revenue and investment rules in mimicking a hierarchical network structure
- Hierarchical structure of transportation networks is a property of **boundaries** & **asymmetries** not entirely a design
- Investment policy can drive shape of hierarchy
- Model scales to metropolitan area


- Existing connectivity measures
 - Basic topological measures: the number of edges (e), the number of vertices (v), the number of maximally connected components, number of circuits
 - Alpha, Beta, Gamma indexes
- Need measures to identify and quantify connection patterns of networks

CONNECTIVITY


- Measures of effectiveness (MOEs)
 - Cumulative change of social welfare
 - Network mobility measures (TTT, VKT)
 - Accessibility




RING



WEB




STAR



HUB-AND-SPOKE


MEASURES OF CONNECTION PATTERNS



- Branch link vs. Circuit link
- Branch, web, ring
- Circuitness ($\phi_{circuit}$) and treeness (ϕ_{tree})
- Beltness (ϕ_{belt})

WEAKEST LINK MODEL

- Begin with ultra-connected network
- Each iteration, kill the weakest link
- Allow rest of links to grow or shrink as the investment rules dictate
- Repeat
- (stop when obtain minimally connected network, I.e. tree)




Iteration 50

Iteration 150

Iteration 200

Iteration 250

		Iteration #	50	150	200	250
The Whole Network	H	Speed entropy	3.041	2.801	2.927	3.263
	γ	The gamma index	0.863	0.569	0.451	0.334
	D	Density	3.677	2.269	1.518	1.003
The Arterial Network	e	Number of edges	80	80	200	240
	n	Number of vertices	45	41	97	120
	u	Number of circuits	0	1	4	1
	z	Number of subgraphs	5	2	1	1
	ϕ_{prim}	The mileage ratio of the primary subgraph	86.4%	91.7%	100.0%	100.0%
	N_{ring}	Number of rings	0	1	0	1
	N_{web}	Number of webs	0	0	1	0
	ϕ_{tree}	The mileage ratio of branching roads	100.0%	41.4%	55.4%	70.7%
	ϕ_{ring}	The mileage ratio of rings	0.0%	58.6%	0.0%	29.3%
	ϕ_{web}	The mileage ratio of webs	0.0%	0.0%	44.6%	0.0%



Experiment C2

EFFICIENCY: ASYMMETRIC CASE





Figure 4. The cumulative change of total welfare over time for the asymmetric case

TOPOLOGY

- Topologies of road networks can be measured, compared, and traced over time.
- The measures of entropy and connection patterns complement existing topological measures of hierarchy and connectivity.
- Improved measurement of network topologies can disclose collective features of road network spatially and temporally and thus guide long-term transportation plans and designs.

**TESTING
PRICING
AND
OWNERSHIP**



CENTRALIZED OWNERSHIP

Pricing Policy

- Fuel taxes, Registration fees, Distance-based tolls
= Average cost pricing

Investment Strategy

- Construction budget = Revenue - Maintenance Cost
- Priority: Links with the highest benefit/cost ratios

Solve $\underset{\Delta Capacity}{Maximize} \quad BCRatio(\Delta Capacity)$
for each link

- At the end of each fiscal year: Budget = Expenditure

DECENTRALIZED OWNERSHIP: PRICING

A Dynamic Pricing Game among All Roads

- Uncertainty and incomplete information

Profit-Maximizing Pricing through Adaptive Learning


1. Estimate a demand curve based on (price, flow) data in previous years for each link;
2. Solve Maximize Profit(price);
3. Case A: $P_{\text{Low}} < \text{Price}^* < P_{\text{High}}$

New Price = Price *

Case B: $\text{Price}^* < P_{\text{Low}}$ or $> P_{\text{High}}$

New Price = $P_{\text{Low}}(1 - j)$

or = $P_{\text{High}}(1 + j)$



DECENTRALIZED OWNERSHIP: INVESTMENT

Rate of Return

- $(\text{Lifecycle Revenue} - \text{Lifecycle Cost}) / \text{Capital Cost}$
- Links can borrow or earn interest through a “Bank” agent
- If Rate of return $>$ interest rate $\rightarrow$ Borrow & Build capacity
Otherwise $\rightarrow$ Pay off loan or Save


Profit Estimation for Capacity Expansion

- Consider two sources of additional profit after expansion
 1. Ability to charge higher tolls
 2. Ability to attract more users


FIXED DEMAND: EQUILIBRIUM CAPACITY

Equilibrium Capacity on a 10x10 Grid Network


Capacity (veh/hr)




Socially
Optimal



Centralized
Ownership



Decentralized
Ownership




FIXED DEMAND: EQUILIBRIUM TOLLS

Equilibrium Toll


Toll (\$)




Socially
Optimal



Centralized
Ownership




Decentralized
Ownership



DECENTRALIZED OWNERSHIP WITH REGULATION


Determination of the Optimal Ceiling Price

Million \$




EVOLUTION OF BENEFIT

Net Social Benefit (M\$)




EVOLUTION OF TOLLS

Average Toll (\$)



EVOLUTION OF CAPACITY

Cumulative Number of Capacity Expansion Projects



OWNERSHIP

Nothing is perfect

	<i>Pros</i>	<i>Cons</i>
<i>Centralized</i>	Status quo Cost recovery	Low tolls, Ineffective Sub-optimal capacity
<i>Decentralized</i>	Responsiveness Market-oriented	High tolls Risk of over-investment

When appropriate regulation is imposed (e.g. P_{max})
and/or travel demand is steadily increasing (e.g. 3%)
Results are in favor of decentralized market-oriented approach

CONCLUSIONS

- This framework allows understanding of changing spatial structure of networks.
- Model of transportation network (with flows moving across space and time as function of costs) along with changing capacity and price of connections (nodes and links) is a model of the economy in miniature.
- Future research could extend this platform to more realistically understand the dynamic relationships between firms (links) and markets (nodes).

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- Zhang, Lei and David Levinson (2005) [The Economics of Transportation Network Growth](#)

¿QUESTIONS?



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