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The Parking Game

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Motivation

- Parking search traffic can be substantial (average 30%, 16 cities, D. Shoup, 2007)
- Parking supply and price can have impact on e.g. mode and destination choice
- Parking can be used for modelling policy: Models should help to design parking policies
- Requirement: Model should be compatible with agent-based user equilibrium models like MATSim

How is agent-based parking search modelled till now?

- In Benenson *et al.* (2008) PARKAGENT is presented:
- residential parking
- agent's enter simulation close to destination
- decision in each time step (park or not)
- take any parking, after destination link
- max. search time 10min: drive to closest off-street parking

What are the challenges? What is missing?


- Just one single strategy for all people => realistic?
- Treating off-street parking ALWAYS as a last option
 - systematic over-estimation of parking search time
- What is strategy based on?

Multiple Parking Strategies


Axhausen and Polak (1989):

- > First comes parking strategy choice
- > group discussions/ surveys: 7 search strategies
 - > e.g. high probability parking set
 - > anchor: off-street parking and use on-street parking, if opportunity arises
 - > circle around destination
 - > illegal parking
 - > combinations
- > Survey to find out which strategies used in Karlsruhe/Birmingham?

General Structure of Parking Search Strategies



Instantiation of Parking Strategy



Utility Function

$$U_{parking,i} = U_{P_{cost},i} + U_{P_{searchTime},i} + U_{P_{walk},i} + \epsilon_i \quad (1)$$

$$U_{plan,i} = \sum U_{travelTime,i} + U_{travelCost,i} + U_{performActivity,i} \dots + \sum U_{parking,i} \quad (2)$$

Utility function used: Weis et al. (2013) => age, gender, income

- Sensitive to policy changes
 - Price change
 - Supply/capacity change
 - Restricting allowed parking time (e.g. max. parking)
 - Increased law enforcement

The Parking Game


- Parking game played by people/agents as part of a bigger game against each other (in the context of activity/travel demand). Goal of the game is to chose/find a parking strategy, which maximizes the parking utility of the agent
- Utility score used to provide feedback to the higher level game

Optimization (similar to MATSim)

strategy «templates» A B C D

iteration	executed	memory (max size=3)
1	A1	-5.1 A1
2	B1	-5.1 -2.7 A1 B1
3	C1	-5.1 -2.7 -6.3 A1 B1 C1
memory initialization completed; continue with 80% MNL; 20% new strategy		
4	MNL B1	-5.1 -2.4 -6.3 A1 B1 C1
5	new instance D1	-5.1 -2.4 -5.3 A1 B1 D1 <small>worst instance dropped</small>
6	new instance A2	-5.1 -2.4 -4.7 A1 B1 A2 <small>worst instance dropped</small>


MATSim Simulation with Parking Search




Experiments

- We have implemented around 15 strategies – mostly based on ideas from Axhausen and Polak (1989) + Park Agent + other Heuristics
- Scenario: Zürich – replanning only for parking search strategies – other replanning fixed

Study Area (2.5km radius)




Parking Capacities




Strategies

Strategies	(primary) focus
ARD-G	garage
BRD(300m)-G	garage
ARD-TakeClosestGarageParking	garage
BRD-TakeClosestGarageParking	garage
BRD(300m)-S-G	street -> garage
Parkagent	street -> garage
ARD-S	street
BRD(300m)-S	street
ARD-waiting-S	street
ARD-illegal-S	street -> illegal


Parking Strategy Shares




Score Graph



Usage of Garage Parking Strategies




Traffic counts difference due to neglecting Parking Search traffic



Parking Activity Properties

Parking Type	Walk Distance [m]		Search Time [s]		Cost [CHF]		Activity Duration [s]	
	mean	sd	mean	sd	mean	sd	mean	sd
Illegal	87.4	83.22	22.39	44.14	44.8	50.37	467.1	521.76
Street	162.77	182.40	120	1209.5	3.05	8.28	26418	20930
Private	87.6	69.54	0	0	0	0	20865	20415
Garage	330.1	1087.2	80.97	161.52	10.85	7.52	10395	9246.1
Public Outside Zurich	115.2	116.21	24.7	44.48	0	0	24568	20042

Role of Multiple Strategy Plans



Sensitivity Analysis - Strategies

- Reduction of street parking by 33%

Strategy	access	Change (%)
ARD-G	garage	-0.1
BRD(300m)-G	garage	+0.1
ARD-TakeClosestGarageParking	garage	+2.4
BRD-TakeClosestGarageParking	garage	+3.2
BRD(300m)-S-G	street -> garage	-1.2
Parkagent	street -> garage	-0.4
ARD-S	street	-2.6
BRD(300m)-S	street	-0.7
ARD-waiting-S	street	+0.3
ARD-illegal-S	street -> illegal	-1.1

Stability and Uniqueness of Solution

At relaxed state comparison between iteration i and $i + 1$ yields:

- ca. 5.5% of the parking locations are switched
- ca. 53 % of strategy plans changed
- ca. 33% percent of strategy groups changed

Keep all Strategy Groups vs. Unconstrained Evolution



Future Work

- Keep all strategy groups vs. unconstrained evolution
 - Stability of solution, if changes happen
- Toll Pricing & Parking Search
 - Toll aware parking strategies => try to park vehicle outside toll area walk from there
 - => see, how this strategy competes with other strategies
- Integration in MATSim
 - replanning modules
 - physical simulation

Conclusions

- Show, how parking search could be modelled as part of a user equilibrium model (as a sub-game)
- First analysis of the various properties of such a model

Questions?